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IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS FOR FEDERAL MARGIN VIOLATIONS:
THE CORT v. ASH FACTORS
INTRODUCTION
The controversy over implied private causes of action for margin violations
under section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act' may be nearing final resolu-
tion. The Second Circuit's decision in Pearlstein v. Scudder & German,2 the
leading case granting a cause of action, 3 has been undermined by amend-
ments to section 7 subjecting borrowers as well as lenders to the margin
requirements. 4 Several courts have accordingly questioned Pearlstein's valid-
ity,5 including the Second Circuit itself. 6 The confusion was increased in 1975
by Cort v. Ash, 7 in which the Supreme Court established a four-part test to
determine whether a private action should be implied for violation of a federal
statute that contains no express remedy.8 Applying the Ash factors, several
lower courts have recently reached conflicting results on the propriety of
implied section 7 actions. 9
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976).
2. 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
3. Accord, Spoon v. Walston & Co., 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); McNeal v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Neill v. David A.
Noyes & Co., 416 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Evans v. Kerbs & Co., 411 F. Supp. 616
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Teitelbaum v. Scranton Nat'l Bank, 384 F. Supp. 1139 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Golob
v. Nauman Vandervoort, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Manevich v. duPont, 338 F.
Supp. 1124 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 465 F.2d 138 (2d. Cir. 1972); Avery v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971).
4. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 301, 84 Stat. 1124 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78g(f) (1976)), discussed at notes 32-39 infra and accompanying text.
5. See Utah State Univ. of Agriculture & Applied Science v. Bear, Steams & Co., 549 F.2d
164, 169-70 (10th Cir), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); McCormick v. Esposito, 500 F.2d 620,
627-28 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 912 (1975); Gordon v. duPont Glore Forgan Inc.,
487 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); Naftalin & Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 469 F.2d 1166, 1181-82 (8th Cir. 1972); Goldman v. Bank
of Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 446-47 (6th Cir. 1972); Drasner v. Thomson McKinnon Sec.,
Inc., 433 F. Supp. 485, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Freeman v Marine Midland Bank-New York, 419
F. Supp. 440, 451-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Lantz v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 418 F. Supp.
653, 654 (D. Alaska 1976); Newman v. Pershing & Co., 412 F. Supp. 463, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Bell v. J.D. Winer & Co., 392 F. Supp. 646, 653-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1975.)
6. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 527 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975) ("The effect of (the
amendments to § 7] is to cast doubt on the continued viability of the rationale of our prior
holding.").
7. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
8. See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
9. The following decisions have granted a cause of action: Gutter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,239 (S.D. Ohio
1977); Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915 (D. Conn.
1977). Contra, Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,528 (D. Md. Feb. 16, 1978); Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 444 F.
Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Gluck v. Frankel, 440 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Schy v.
FDIC, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,242 (E.D.N.Y. 1977);
Theoharous v. Bache & Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,281 (D.
Conn. 1977).
MARGIN VIOLATIONS
The purpose of this Note is to analyze whether implication of private
remedies under section 7 is appropriate in light of Ash. Part I will review the
history of implied causes of action for margin violations prior to Ash. Part II
will contend that proper application of the Ash factors should preclude the
establishment of such actions for failure to comply with the requirements of
section 7.
I. THE LAW PRIOR TO Ash
Unregulated margin trading 0--the unlimited purchase of securities on
credit-contributed significantly to the stock market crash of 1929 and the
ensuing depression.'1 Section 7 was enacted to aid in the prevention of a
similar financial catastrophe; its primary purpose is to protect the national
economy from excessive speculation.1 2 The section grants to the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) the authority to regulate the
maximum amount of credit that may be extended for the purpose of purchas-
ing or carrying securities.1 3
Pursuant to its authority under section 7, the Board has placed limitations
on the authority of brokers and other lenders to conduct credit transactions.
Regulation T restricts the amount of credit that may be extended by broker-
dealers,1 4 Regulation U limits the extension of credit by banks in order to
acquire certain securities if collateralized by some form of stock,' 5 and
Regulation G governs loans made by persons other than banks, brokers, or
dealers.1 6 Manifestly, section 7 and the regulations thereunder were originally
10. The advantages to investors of margin transactions were aptly summarized by Professor
Galbraith: "In the stock market the buyer of securities on margin gets full title to his property in
an unconditional sale. But he rids himself of the most grievous burden of ownership-that of
putting up the purchase price-by leaving his securities with his broker as collateral for the loan
that paid for them. The buyer again gets the full benefit of any increase in value-the price of the
securities goes up, but the loan that bought them does not. In the stock market the speculative
buyer also gets the earnings of the securities he purchased." J. K. Galbraith, The Great Crash,
1929, at 24 (3d ed. 1972).
11. Solomon & Hart, Recent Developments in the Regulation of Securities Credit, 20 J. Pub.
L. 167, 168-69 (1971). See generaUy J.K. Galbraith, supra note 10, at 23-27.
12. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934), reprinted in S Legislative History of
the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item 18, at 8 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Legislative History].
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1976). "For the purpose of preventing the excessive use of credit for
the purchase or carrying of securities, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
shall.., prescribe rules and regulations with respect to the amount of credit that may be initially
extended and subsequently maintained on any security . . . ." Id.
14. 12 C.F.R_ §§ 220.1-. 130 (1978). Mfargin rules restrict the use of credit in market purchases
by establishing a "maximum loan value" for securities purchased. The present "maximum loan
value" of securities is 50%. Id. §§ 207.5, 220.8, 221.4. Thus, if an investor wishes to purchase
stock for $5,000, he must put up at least $2,500 in collateral. If he purchases through a general
account, he will have five full business days after the purchase to deposit the "margin", that is,
the remainder of the purchase price. Id. § 220.3(b). If full payment is not received within that
time, the broker must liquidate the account. Id.
15. Id. §§ 221.1-.122.
16. Id. §§ 207.1-.8. Every person who, in the ordinary course of his business, extends or
arranges for the extension of credit totaling $100,000 or more during any calendar quarter or has
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directed solely toward the extenders of credit. This provided many courts
with a basis for implying private actions in favor of injured borrowers., 7
Indeed, one early decision construed the section's failure to regulate the
investor as an indication by Congress that the investor required protection
since he was incapable of protecting himself.' 8
The leading case prior to Cort v. Ash allowing private actions against
lenders for section 7 violations was the Second Circuit's decision in Pearlstein
v. Scudder & German.19 Plaintiff had purchased bonds from defendant
broker on credit, but failed to pay the balance due within seven business days
after the date of purchase. Although required by Regulation T to liquidate
plaintiff's account when he did not receive payment within that time, 20
defendant retained the securities, which were not sold until six months later at
a substantial loss. Plaintiff sued to recover the difference between the amount
he would have received had the bonds been timely sold and what he received
upon their actual sale. 21 Defendant, admitting the Regulation T infraction,
argued that recovery should be denied because the plaintiff had acted
according to a "conscious plan to profit from the illegal extension of credit"
and had induced the defendant to enter into the transaction. 22
The majority rejected defendant's contention, stating that plaintiff's subjec-
tive knowledge of the margin requirements and his motives for entering the
transaction were immaterial. 23 "[T]he danger of permitting a windfall to an
unscrupulous investor is outweighed by the salutary policing effect which the
threat of private suits for compensatory damages can have upon brokers and
dealers above and beyond the threats of governmental action by the Securities
a total of $500,000 or more in credit secured by collateral that includes margin securities is subject
to this regulation. Id. § 207.1(a).
17. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Cooper v. Union Bank, 354 F. Supp. 669, 676 (C.D. Cal. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Van de Carr, 343 F. Supp.
993, 1013-14 (C.D. Cal. 1972); In re Naftalin & Co., 333 F. Supp. 136, 144-45 (D. Minn. 1971),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Naftalin & Co., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 469 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1972); Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328
F. Supp. 677, 680-81 (D.D.C. 1971); 39 Fordham L. Rev. 782, 790-91 (1971).
18. Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949).
19. 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
20. The seven day limit applies to purchases of securities in "special cash accounts." 12
C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(2) (1978). In special cash accounts, uncollatemlized purchases on credit are
extended by the broker upon the understanding that the customer will make full cash payment
within a short time. Id. § 220.4(c)(1).
21. 429 F.2d at 1139. The proper measure of damages in Pearlstein was the subject of a later
Second Circuit decision. In Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 527 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1975), the
court held that the investor could recover that proportion of the stock's decline in value that the
unpaid balance of the debt bore to the total purchase price. Id. at 1146. For example, assume
that the total purchase price is $10,000 and that prior to the seven day limit the borrower paid
$4,000, or 40% of the total purchase price. Defendant would be liable for 60% of the stock's
decline in value between the end of the seven day period and the date the stock is ultimately sold.
Id. at 1146 n.7. The defendant was not held liable for plaintiff's losses prior to the margin
violation. Moreover, plaintiff was not entitled to recover interest, treble damages, punitive
damages, or counsel fees. Id. at 1147.
22. 429 F.2d at 1140.
23. Id. at 1141.
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and Exchange Commission. '24 The majority conceded that the protection of
the investor was a purpose only incidental to the primary goal of protecting
the national economy from excessive speculation. 2s Nevertheless, it concluded
that a private action was justified because its deterrent effect would advance
the statutory purpose of protecting the securities industry from margin
violations. 26 The majority also held that the doctrine of in pari delicto would not
bar recovery, reasoning that the regulations forbade the extension of illegal
credit but not its acceptance, even when the investor has knowledge of the
margin requirements. 2
7
In his dissent, Judge Friendly argued that section 7 was intended only to
prevent widespread margin abuse and not to protect investors. He disagreed
that implication of a private action would advance the statutory purpose,
noting that the Securities and Exchange Commission could effectively per-
form the task of enforcement. 28 Judge Friendly further reasoned that allowing
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1140. "The main purpose of these margin provisions in section [7] is not to increase
the safety of security loans for lenders. Banks and brokers normally require sufficient collateral to
make themselves safe without the help of law. Nor is the main purpose even protection of the
small speculator by making it impossible for him to spread himself too thinly-although such a
result will be achieved as a byproduct of the main purpose.
"The main purpose is to give a Government credit agency an effective method of reducing the
aggregate amount of the nation's credit resources which can be directed by speculation into the
stock market and out of other more desirable uses of commerce and industry.. . ." H.R. Rep.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934), reprinted in S Legislative History, supra note 12, Item
18, at 8.
26. 429 F.2d at 1140. The Pearlstein approach is not the only theory utilized to imply a
private cause of action for § 7 violations. Private actions have been justified on both tort and
contract theories. The leading case expounding the tort theory is Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81
F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949). InRemar, the defendant broker had arranged for the investor to
borrow money in excess of margin requirements from a bank. In upholding plaintiff investor's
right of action, the court cited § 286 of the Restatement of Torts for the proposition that "where
defendant's violation of a prohibitory statute has caused injury to plaintiff the latter has a right of
action if one of the purposes of the enactment was to protect individual interests like the
plaintiff's." Id. at 1017. The Remar court found the requisite congressional intent in a House
report which noted that protection of the investor would be achieved as a byproduct of § 7's main
purpose of reducing market speculation on credit. Id. (citing I-LR. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1934), reprinted in 5 Legislative History, supra note 12, Item 18, at 8, quoted at note 25
supra). In dismissing the argument that the plaintiff was barred from suing because of his
participation in the transaction, the court reasoned that Congress had considered him "incapable
of protecting himself." 81 F. Supp. at 1017.
The contract theory for implying a cause of action for margin violations is based upon § 29(b)
of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976), which voids any contract in violation of the Act. Section
29(b) has served as the basis for a rescission action, Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp.
581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), and as a defense to a broker's demand for the price of securities purchased
in violation of § 7. E.g., Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 67S (5th Cir. 1959) (lender's
counterclaim denied).
27. 429 F.2d at 1141. See also Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp.
677, 681 (D.D.C. 1971). "The Court deplores this type of alleged investor behavior and were not
the mandate of Congress so unequivocal and the public policy considerations so strong, the Court
might reach a substantially different decision than the one it does. The participation, however, by
plaintiff is not enough to relieve the defendant of its squarely imposed statutory duty.. . ." Id.
28. 429 F.2d at 1147-48 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
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a plaintiff to recover losses suffered from a transaction that he knew to be
illegal would induce investors to engage in margin violations. 29
The broad reasoning in Pearlstein, which permits recovery even when the
plaintiff is aware of the defendant's illegal conduct, prompted criticism in
subsequent cases. Several courts refused to extend Pearlstein's rejection of the
in pari delicto doctrine to situations in which an investor entered into a
conspiracy to defraud a broker3" or deceived a lender as to the purpose of a
loan. 31 Moreover, the change in legislative policy reflected in the amendment
of section 7 cast further doubt on the Second Circuit's rationale.
In 1970, Congress enacted section 7(f),32 which extended the limitations
imposed on margin trading to those who borrow to acquire or maintain
margin securities. Section 7(f)33 forbids
any United States person, or any foreign person controlled by a United States person
.. . to obtain, receive, or enjoy the beneficial use of a loan or other extension of credit
from any lender (without regard to whether the lender's office or place of business is in
a State or the transaction occurred in whole or in part within a State) for the purpose
of (A) purchasing or carrying United States securities, or (B) purchasing or carrying
within the United States of any other securities, if . . . the loan or other credit
transaction is prohibited or would be prohibited if it had been made or the transaction
had otherwise occurred in a lender's office or other place of business in a State.
34
Although section 7(f) applies to both foreign and domestic transactions, it
was primarily intended to curtail the infusion of unregulated foreign credit
into the securities market.3 5 Regulation X, promulgated pursuant to section
7(f), prohibits an investor from obtaining credit from within or without the
United States unless the lender complies with the regulations applicable to
domestic creditors. 36 It provides, however, that an innocent mistake made in
29. Id. at 1148 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
30. In Moscare~li v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), the plaintiff had entered Into
a fraudulent conspiracy with employees of defendant for the purpose of placing orders for
securities which he falsely represented that he could pay for. The court upheld the defense of In
pari delicto. Id. at 459-60. Although decided prior to Pearlstein, post-Pearlstein decisions have
indicated that Moscarelli is unaltered thereby. See, e.g., Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677, 679 (D.D.C. 1971). See also Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290
F. Supp. 74, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd per curiam, -409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 904 (1969) (pre-Pearlstein decision barring recovery when investor defrauds lender).
31. Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972),
32. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 301. 84 Stat. 1124 (codified at 15 U.SC. §
78g(f) (1976)).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1976).
34. Id. § 78g(f)(1).
35. H.R. Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4394, 4399; see Solomon & Hart, supra note 11, at 202-11; Comment, Civil Liability for
Margin Violations-The Effect of Section 7(f) and Regulation X, 43 Fordham L, Rev. 93, 104-06
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Margin Violations]; Note, Regulation X and Investor-Lender Margin
Violation Disputes, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 208, 215-20 (1972). Note, Regulation X: A Complexis, 50
Notre Dame Law. 136, 139-40 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Complexis].
36. 12 C.F.R. §§ 224.1-.6 (1978). Thus, an investor may not obtain credit from either a
foreign or domestic bank unless the bank complies with Regulation U. Id. §§ 221.1-.122.
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good faith by a borrower in obtaining credit shall not be deemed a violation if it is
promptly remedied after discovery. 37
The creation of borrower liability for section 7 infractions undermined the
rationale for granting the investor a right to seek damages3 8 and contributed
greatly to the present conflict. 39 Courts questioned whether, in light of
subdivision (f), the intended meaning of section 7 was the same as that
attributed to it by the Pearlstein majority. 40 Several decisions held that
section 7(f) had precluded implication of a private cause of action.4 1 Others,
while refusing to deny private remedies under section 7, held that the
enactment of section 7(f) had effectively resurrected the in pari delicto defense
which Pearlstein had denied. 42 Until recently, this judicial rift was exacer-
bated by confusion over the factors relevant to analysis of the propriety of
implied actions. 43
Regulation U provides that no bank shall extend any credit collateralized by security in an
amount exceeding 50% of the security's current market value. Id. § 221.4.
37. Id. § 224.6(a).
38. The contract and tort theories of recovery were also affected by § 7(0 and Regulation X.
The tort theory's assumption that § 7 was intended to benefit investors is questionable in light of §
7(f)'s inclusion of borrowers in the regulatory scheme. Even if a court determines that an implied
action is proper notwithstanding § 7(f), a defendant lender should be able to raise an in pari
delicto defense if the plaintiff investor has violated § 7(f). See Margin Violations, supra note 35,
at 106-13. Furthermore, the investor's illegal conduct should preclude rescission under § 29(b).
Freeman v. Marine Midland Bank-New York, 419 F. Supp. 440, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); see
Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,573, at 94,405 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1978). Given the equitable nature of a rsson action,
it would seem that a defendant could raise an "unclean hands" defense to bar recovery by a
plaintiff guilty of a § 7 infraction. For a full discussion of the effects of Regulation X on these two
theories of liability, see Complexis, supra note 35, at 144-45, 148-51.
39. For example, the Tenth Circuit in Utah State Univ. of Agriculture & Applied Science v.
Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 170 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977), held that
the enactment of § 7(f) and the promulgation of Regulation X effectively overruled Pearlstein. A
constrasting result was reached by the District of Connecticut in Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon
Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915, 921 (D. Conn. 1977), in which the court held that an
investor may maintain a cause of action against his broker for a § 7 violation. It found that §
7(f)'s only effect on Peorlstein was to resurrect the in pari delicto defense. Id. at 922. See also
Lantz v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 653, 654 (D. Alaska 1976).
40. The Second Circuit itself noted that the enactment of § 7(f) cast doubt on the validity of
its decision in Pearlstein. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. See also Freeman v. Marine
Midland Bank-New York, 419 F. Supp. 440, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
41. See, e.g., Utah State Univ. of Agriculture & Applied Science v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549
F.2d 164, 169-70 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); Drasner v. Thomson McKinnon
Sec., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 485, 499-501 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
42. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915 (D.
Conn. 1977); Lantz v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 653 (D. Alaska 1976). At least
one court felt compelled to adhere to Pearlstein regardless of § 7(f). See Gutter v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., (1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,239, at
92,614 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
43. Compare Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1013 (1971) with Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1002 (1973).
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II. THE Cort v. Ash FACTORS
Until Cort v. Ash, 44 no uniform set of standards had been devised by
federal courts for determining whether to imply private actions for violation
of a federal statute that grants no express remedy. The two-pronged test
introduced in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak45 found early acceptance. Borak
involved an alleged violation of Securities Exchange Act section 14(a), 46
which prohibits the use of false or misleading proxy statements. Despite
Congress' failure to provide expressly for a private action, the Court held that
the protection of investors such as the plaintiff was one of the main objectives
of section 14(a).47 In addition, it found that judicial relief was necessary to
achieve the purposes of the statute.4 8 Thus, under the Borak approach, when
one of the main purposes of the statute is to protect the plaintiff and the
purposes of the statute cannot be achieved absent private enforcement, a
private action should be implied. In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
National Association of Railroad Passengers (Amtrak),49 however, decided ten
years after Borak, the Court focused on three factors in denying a private
action under section 307(a) of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970:50
legislative history, tenets of statutory construction, and the legislative purpose
of the Act.s Both Borak and Amtrak failed to define the relative importance
of their respective requirements, thereby creating considerable confusion in
subsequent decisions .52
In an effort to dispel the confusion, the Supreme Court articulated a four-
part test in its 1975 decision of Cort v. Ash. 5 3 In that case, plaintiff Ash
instituted a stockholder's derivative suit against Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
44. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
45. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
47. 377 U.S. at 431-32. The Court determined that private enforcement was a "necessary
supplement" to the action taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Since the
Commission is unable to examine all proxy statements as carefully as it would like to, undetected
mistakes are inevitable. The possibility of a large damages suit by a stockholder for a material
misrepresentation may, however, provide the corporation with the incentive to scrutinize
carefully the proxy statement prior to its issuance. Id.
48. Id. at 432-33.
49. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
50. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1970). The section expressly authorized only an action by the Attorney
General and a limited private cause of action in cases involving labor disputes.
51. 414 U.S. at 458-64. First, the Court found nothing in the legislative history to warrant the
implication of a private action in favor of a passenger. Id. at 457. Second, the principle of
statutory construction applied declares that when the legislation expressly provides a particular
remedy or remedies, Congress intended to exclude all other remedies. Thus, since § 307(a) of the
Act provided for private actions by aggrieved employees but did not expressly grant passengers
similar rights, the Court refused to infer a private action. Id. at 461. The Supreme Court later
rejected this tenet in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 n.14 (1975). Third, the purpose of the statute
was to eliminate uneconomic routes in an effort to achieve economic viability in the rail passenger
system. To permit a passenger to bring suit to halt the discontinuance of a passenger train would
frustrate that purpose. 414 U.S. at 463-64.
52. Compare Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) with
Securities Investors Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 418-22 (1975).
53. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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Ash alleged that the directors of the corporation had expended corporate
funds for political advertisements in violation of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971.s4 The district court, in denying Ash's request for a
preliminary injunction, found that the primary purpose of the statute was to
destroy the influence of corporations over the national election process
through campaign contributions; the protection of stockholders was only a
secondary concern. 55 The court therefore refused to infer a private cause of
action. The Third Circuit reversed, utilizing a two-part test.5 6 First, the
statute must be "designed to protect plaintiff from the harm he alleges." 7
According to the Third Circuit, Ash's status as a voter and a citizen made him
an intended beneficiary of the election statute. In addition, as a stockholder,
he stood to lose from the illegal expenditures from the corporation's treasury.
The statute was thus "dearly" designed for plaintiffs protection.5 8 Under the
court's second criterion, the requested relief must be consistent with the
statute's objectives.5 9 Because of the often covert nature of political contribu-
tions, the court found that government enforcement alone might prove
insufficient to remedy all violations. A private cause of action would therefore
be consistent with the effectuation of the statutory goals. 60
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, 6 1 and declared that the propri-
ety of implying private actions is determined according to the following
criteria:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted'
... that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a
remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . And, finally, is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern
of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
on federal law?62
It is submitted that application of these factors to section 7 mandates the
denial of private actions to remedy its violations.
A. The Class of Benefitted Plaintiffs
Under the first criterion plaintiff must be a member of the class "for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted." This requisite marks a departure
from prior approaches which would sanction the maintenance of a private
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 & Supp. M 1973) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976)).
55. Ash v. Cort, 350 F. Supp. 227, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
56. Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974). The Third Circuit upheld the lower court's
denial of the preliminary injunction but reversed the decision granting defendant summary
judgment. Id. at 421-24.
57. Id. at 422.
58. Id. The court held that although it may be improper to imply a cause of action in favor of
an incidental beneficiary, protection of the plaintiff need not be the statute's primary purpose in
order to imply a cause of action. Id. at 423.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
62. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
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action when the plaintiffs protection was only a secondary concern of the
statute. 63 The more stringent test adopted in Ash reflects the Supreme Court's
increasing reluctance to extend access to the federal judicial forum.64 More-
over, even upon a finding of especial benefit, courts can deny the cause of
action based upon a statutory intent or purpose to the contrary. 65
In Ash, the Supreme Court held that the criminal statute which prohibited
corporate contributions to political campaigns conferred no federal right of
action on corporate stockholders. The principal purpose of the statute,
according to the Court, was to curtail corporate influence over elections; the
protection of stockholders was at best an ancillary objective. 66
The Court applied similar reasoning a year later in deciding Piper v.
Chris-Crqft Industries, Inc. 67 In Piper, an unsuccessful tender offeror
brought suit for damages and injunctive relief against the management of the
target corporation, alleging, inter alios, violations of section 14(e)68 of the
Exchange Act. Enacted in 1968 as part of the Williams Act,69 section 14(e)
prohibits persons engaged in making or opposing tender offers from making
any untrue statement of a material fact or omitting to state a material fact
that is necessary in order to make the statement not misleading.70 The
legislative history of section 14(e) indicates that its sole purpose is to protect
the stockholders of the target company. 71 Therefore, the Court held, Chris-
Craft Industries, as a defeated tender offeror, was not an intended beneficiary
of the statute and surely not one for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted. '72 The Court further noted that section 14(e) regulates the conduct of
tender offerors; thus it could not cogently be argued that the party whose
activities the statute controls should be deemed a beneficiary of the statute. 73
The Piper reasoning would seem to dictate a similar result when applied to a
63. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
64. Cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) (Court was reluctant to
recognize a cause of action which would promote subsidiary purpose of the statute). See also
Note, Private Causes of Action Under Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 74 Mich. L.
Rev. 308, 315 (1975).
65. For example, in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974), discussed at notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text, the purpose of the
statute allowing railroads to eliminate unprofitable routes was to benefit rail passengers by
providing an economically viable railroad system. The Court held that to allow a passenger to
seek an injunction to halt the discontinuance of a route would frustrate the statutory purpose. Id.
at 463.
66. 422 U.S. at 80-81.
67. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
69. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, §§ 2-3, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C, §§
78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976)).
70. Id.
71. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 35; see S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1967); 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
72. 430 U.S. at 37 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78).
73. "As a party whose previously unregulated conduct was purposefully brought under federal
control by the statute, Chris-Craft can scarcely lay clim to the status of 'benefidary' whom
Congress considered in need of protection." Id. (emphtasis added).
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discussion of the beneficiaries of section 7. In Pearlstein, the Second Circuit
held that Congress viewed the protection of individual investors as only an
incidental purpose of the statute. 74 The statute's primary purpose was to
protect the national economy from an overextension of credit in the securities
market75 The Board's regulations controlling the lending activities of brok-
ers, dealers, and banks in connection with the purchase of securities are also
consistent with the desire to safeguard the nation's fiscal well-being, but do
not seem intended for the primary benefit of any particular class of persons. 7 6
Indeed, by assuring investors that losses sustained through margin speculation
may be recouped in an action for damages, a private right of action would
seem to detract from the purpose of the statute to control such activity.
The enactment of section 7(f), and the promulgation of Regulation X
thereunder, also indicate that investors are not the primary beneficiaries of
section 7.77 Congress elected to subject borrowers to margin requirements as a
means of controlling the intrusion of foreign credit into the national securities
market. 78 A credit-seeking investor must now comply with the margin
requirements or face criminal penalties---a position virtually identical to that
of the creditor who enables him to purchase or maintain the securities.79
Comparison with the Court's reasoning in Piper is instructive. Section 14(e)
placed the duty of compliance on the defeated tender offeror, who now sought
to take advantage of its provisions.80 Just as that section was held not to
create a cause of action in favor of those whom it regulates, a private remedy
74. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1140 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1013 (1971); see note 25 supra and accompanying text.
75. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934), reprinted in 5 Legislative History,
supra note 12, Item 18, at 8; see Solomon & Hart, supra note 11, at 168-69; Comment, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934-Civil Remedies Based Upon Illegal Extension of Credit in Violation of
Regulation T, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 940, 944-47 (1963). Congressional hearings prior to the enactment
of the Act documented the "dose relationship between securities credit and stock prices, and the
potentially destabilizing economic effects of sharp swings in the stock price level." Solomon &
Hart, supra note 11, at 169.
76. See Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Schy v. FDIC, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,242, at 92,631 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Theoharous v. Bache & Co., (1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,281, at 92,802 (D. Conn. 1977). But see McNeal
v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 359, 364 (N.D. Ga. 1977); note 133 infra
and accompanying text.
77. See H.R. Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [19701 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 4394, 4399.
78. "When foreign financial secrecy is imposed upon the natural complexity of some of these
transactions, it is virtually impossible for the Securities and Exchange Commission to know
whether any laws are being violated. Moreover, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is
primarily a disclosure act and with foreign financial secrecy, there can be no full disclosure. This
legislation will remedy much of this problem by extending the applicability of margin require-
ments under section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act to the purchasers of stock as well as to
broker-dealers and financial institutions who lend money for that purpose." I-LL Rep. No. 975,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4394, 4399; see notes
32-39 supra and accompanying text.
79. Regulation X does exempt investors from § 7 liability for innocent mistakes made in good
faith which are promptly rectified upon discovery. 12 C.F.R. § 224.6(a) (1978).
80. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
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should not be available to investors subject to the requirements of section 7(f).
The status of investors as incidental beneficiaries of section 7 should thus
preclude an implied action under Ash's "especial benefit" requirement. The
Eastern District of New York, relying on this first criterion, has held that no
private cause of action will lie against a broker who violates the mandates of
section 7.81 The court stated simply that section 7 was not intended especially
to benefit the purchasers of margin securities. 8 2 The District of Connecticut,
however, in apparent disregard of the Ash standards, implied a cause of
action despite acknowledging that investor protection was a byproduct of the
statute.8 3 The court found that private investors are within the class intended
to benefit from section 7, and that margin violations would go unreported
absent private enforcement.8 4 That decision ignores section 7(f)'s clarification
of the legislative policy subsequent to Pearlstein, and incorrectly equates
incidental purpose with "especial benefit."8 5
B. Legislative Intent
An express legislative intent to create or-deny a cause of action is dispositive
on the private remedy issue.8 6 Where no express legislative intent to create a
private action may be found, courts are forced to search for evidence of
implicit intent.8 7 In many instances the quest may prove futile. However, the
Supreme Court in Ash made it clear that absence of legislative intent is not
conclusive; courts may still imply private causes of action if appropriate under
the other three factors.8 8
81. Schy v. FDIC, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,242 (E.D.N.Y.
1977).
82. Id. at 92,631.
83. Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon, Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915, 921 (D. Conn.
1977). Similarly, the Northern District of Georgia in McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ga. 1977), ignored the Ash standards in implying a cause of
action. The court held that an investor who is "affirmatively misled by his broker into believing
that his account is in compliance with Regulation T" should be granted a private couse of action
to recover any losses he suffered as a result of the violation. Id. at 365; cf. Neill v. David A.
Noyes & Co., 416 F. Supp. 78, 80 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (innocent plaintiffs may bring action). Factors
such as the innocence of the investor or the fraudulent conduct of the creditor, however, are
irrelevant under the Ash standards.
84. Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915, 921 (D. Conn.
1977). The court relied on Regulation X, see note 79supra, to find that § 7(f) does not alter the
Pearlstein holding. 427 F. Supp. at 921.
85. Ironically, six months after the Palmer decision the District of Connecticut found it
"self-evident that § 7(c) was not enacted for the especial benefit of the investor plaintiff and
therefore did not create a federal right in his favor .... Theoharous v. Bache & Co., [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 96,281, at 92,802 (D. Conn. 1977).
86. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975).
87. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 458-61 (1974).
88. 422 U.S. at 79-80, 82; see Note, Private Causes of Action Under Section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 308, 316-20 (1975).
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The Court in Ash also acknowledged that if it is clear that Congress
intended to grant federal rights to a certain class of plaintiffs, to find an
additional intent to create a private remedy in that class is not necessary.8 9
Thus, the Court in Borak found no need to search for an implied intent to
create a private action after concluding that section 14(a) created federal
rights in stockholders. 90 However, a legislative intent to deny a private action
to a class will control even when the statute expressly confers rights in that
class. 91
When it is at least questionable whether a plaintiff has been provided with
federal rights, legislative intent should be examined. 92 For example, the Ash
Court, once accepting the legislation's primary concern with corporate
influence on elections and not the corporation's relationship with its stock-
holders, 93 found it unclear whether Congress intended to vest plaintiff with
federal rights. Similarly, since the primary purpose of section 7 is not to
protect investors, 94 it is not dear whether the investor is given federal rights.
Therefore, an examination of legislative intent is appropriate.
Early Senate proposals concerning margin requirements attempted to pro-
tect the investor as well as to regulate the economy. 9" Under heavy criti-
cism, 96 this plan was abandoned in favor of the House of Representatives'
proposal which subordinated investor protection to the attainment of the
broader objectives of proper utilization of national credit resources. 97 The
legislative history of section 7, however, does not indicate that Congress
considered the issue of private causes of action. Several interpretations have
been attached to this silence. One district court has noted that since Congress
had considered the need to protect the investor and failed expressly to furnish
him with a private remedy, an intent to deny him a cause of action is properly
inferred. 98 Such reasoning, however, has not proved ineluctable in past
implied action controversies. For example, Congress was cognizant of the
need to protect shareholders in enacting section 14(a) but failed to provide an
express remedy for their detrimental reliance on misleading proxy state-
89. 422 U.S. at 82.
90. 377 U.S. at 432. The Court reasoned that since one of the chief purposes of the statute
is to protect investors, judicial relief must be available when necessary to achieve the desired
result. Id.; see notes 121-23 infra and accompanying text.
91. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 82.
92. Id. at 82-83.
93. Id.
94. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934), reprinted in 5 Legislative
History, supra note 12, Item 21, at 11.
96. See, e.g., Hearings on Stock Exchange Regulation Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 509-10 (1934) reprinted in 9 Legislative History,
supra note 12, Item 23, at 509-10 (statement of John Dickinson).
97. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934), reprinted in S Legislative History,
supra note 12, Item 18, at 8. "[C]onsiderations which affect not a general national credit policy,
but only the safety of a particular stock transaction from the standpoint of a particular lender and
particular borrower-are unimportant." Id.
98. Schy v. FDIC, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,242, at 92,630
(E.D.N.Y. 1977).
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ments. 99 It is nevertheless uncontroverted that section 14(a) supports the
implication of a private right of action brought by a shareholder.100
Another district court, in denying a cause of action for section 7 violations,
relied upon a statement in Ash that when a plaintiff's status as a special
beneficiary under the statute is questionable, congressional silence should be
interpreted to allow state law to control the relationship. 10 1 Unlike the
director-shareholder relationship present in Ash, 10 2 however, the relationship
of margin lender and borrower is not one traditionally governed by state
law.1 0 3 Thus, utilizing Congress' silence to deny an action under section 7
may to that extent be an inappropriate application of the Ash standards.
Congress' intention to establish private remedies for margin violations
became more questionable with the enactment of section 7(f). As noted above,
the congressional proponents of section 7(f) sought to regulate the influx of
foreign credit into the securities market.' 0 4 The original version of section 7
did not refer to foreign creditors, and at least one court had interpreted this
silence to indicate that the regulations passed by the Board controlling banks
and other lenders did not apply to institutions located outside the United
States. 105 It later became apparent that an amendment was necessary to
curtail the potential destabilizing effect of foreign credit on the market. 10 6 The
enactment of section 7(f) indicates Congress' determination that the regulation
of borrowers was the most expeditious way to control foreign lenders.'
0 7
Since section 7(f) places a duty of margin compliance upon the borrower, 108
it is arguable that Congress intended that he be given no private remedy. A
similar argument was adopted in Piper. After examining the legislative
history of section 14(e), the Piper Court concluded that it evinced an intent to
99. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
100. Id. at 433.
101. Theoharous v. Bache & Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,281, at 92,802 (D. Conn. 1977) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 82-83).
102. See note 137 infra and accompanying text.
103. See Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 96,528, at 94,089 (D. Md. Feb. 16, 1978); Schy v. FDIC, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 1 96,242, at 92,630 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
104. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
105. Metro-Goldwin-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). Prior to Transamerica, it had been inferred that if a transaction had an effect in the United
States, the Securities Exchange Act applied. See Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 279 F. Supp. 935
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969) (foreign based
mutual fund found liable for violation of Securities Exchange Act).
106. Foreign Bank Secrecy and Bank Records: Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 23 (1969-1970) (statement of Robert
M. Morganthau).
107. "Through a simple device of making the margin requirements applicable to the borrower
as well as to the lender, we will be equipping the Securities and Exchange Commission... with
sufficient legal and investigative weapons to require adequate disclosure of foreign financing." 116
Cong. Rec. 16954 (1970) (statement of Rep. Patman, Chairman of the House Committee on
Banking and Currency). See also H.R. Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1970]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4394, 4399; S. Rep. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1970).
108. See notes 32-37 sufira and accompanying text.
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curb the unfettered activities of tender offerors.109 This purpose, the Court
reasoned, "negate[d] the claim that tender offerors were intended to have
additional weapons in the form of an implied cause of action for damages,
particularly if a private damages action confers no advantage on the expressly
protected class of shareholders-offerees ... "1o10 Similarly, granting a cause of
action under section 7 to the same investors that it regulates would seem not
to advance the primary statutory purpose of protecting the national economy,
and to that extent would be inconsistent with the legislative objectives.
Although such reasoning is appealing, the obvious flaw of attempting to
construe congressional silence stems from its purely suppositional nature. In
sum, little can be gleaned from section 7's legislative history other than its
purpose to safeguard the national economy from the infusion of unregulated
credit into the securities market. Indeed, many courts have admitted the
shortcomings of implying a congressional intent when none exists."' Accord-
ing to at least one commentator, "judicial attention should focus not on what
Congress might have intended by its silence, but, rather, on how best to
remedy a private injury caused by conduct which Congress did expressly
prohibit."'1 2 Before determining "how best to remedy a private injury,"
however, the Ash criteria dictate a preliminary finding that such injury should
indeed be remedied. An examination of the consistency of the private action
with the legislative purpose may aid in that determination.
C. Consistency with the Statutory Purposes
The third factor enunciated by the Ash Court is whether the proposed
remedy is consistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme. Obviously,
an express legislative provision for or against a private remedy obviates a
discussion of the consistency of the remedy with the statutory purpose. 113
When, however, the legislative intent does not preclude such an action, the
third factor acquires significance in the final determination.
109. 430 U.S. at 38.
110. Id.
111. Such shortcomings arise from the often unreliable nature of statements contained in
legislative history. Thus, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976), the
Court declared that statements by persons other than the drafters of a statute made during
legislative debate or hearings are entitled to little consideration. Similarly, in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court acknowledged the hazards of inquiring into congressional
motives. "What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what
motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew
guesswork." Id. at 384; accord, Note, Emerging Standards for Implied Actions Under Federal
Statutes, 9 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 294, 310 (1976).
112. Pillai, Negative Implication: The Demise of Private Rights of Action in the Federal
Courts, 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1978). Professor Pillai states that courts should be permitted to
redress grievances resulting from statutory violations unless Congress expressly provides oth-
erwise. Id. at 24. If Congress desired to deny or curtail private remedies it would do so expressly,
and no negative inference should arise from Congress' failure to provide an explicit private
remedy. Id. at 26. "Express provisions for private remedies are best understood as qualifying or
relaxing adjustments to the private remedies which are implied by operation of the common law."
Id. Thus, absent an express intention by Congress to the contrary, Professor Pillai asserts that
common-law implied action principles should control. Id.
113. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Although ostensibly more lenient than Borak's "necessary supplement"
approach,1 1 4 the third factor's application in Ash indicates that the latter is
equally rigorous."I 5 The Ash Court did not ask merely whether the implica-
tion of a cause of action would be consistent with the legislative purposes, but
whether the proposed remedy would aid in the statute's enforcement. 1 6 The
Court's probable intent was to preclude a private action unless it is necessary
to effectuate the statutory objectives.1 1 7
The purpose of the election laws in Ash was to curtail corporate influence in
national elections by limiting financial contributions."I8 Therefore, the Court
concluded, that purpose would not be aided by a private action. Allowing the
corporate stockholder to recoup the corporate funds expended would not cure
the influence the funds had on the election.' 19 Moreover, the Court doubted if
the threat of damages would have a deterrent effect upon violators.120 In
sum, a private action was not viewed as a "necessary supplement" to public
enforcement in order to attain legislative goals.
The Borak Court, on the other hand, found a private action to be a
"necessary supplement" in the enforcement of section 14(a). 12 1 The purpose of
section 14(a), which regulates proxy statements, is to provide the stockholder
with adequate information in order for him to vote intelligently on corporate
matters.1 22 Because the Commission was unable to examine properly all
proxy statements, the Court held that private enforcement was an essential
aid to Commission action. 123
One district court has recently relied upon the Borak approach to find that
a private cause of action exists under section 7.124 As noted by the dissenting
opinion in Pearlstein, however, the purposes of section 7 render the Borak
approach inappropriate to margin violations. 12 s The primary purpose of
section 7 is to provide a government agency with the power to limit the
aggregate amount of credit which may be directed into the stock market and
away from more economically productive uses. 126 Implication of a private
cause of action would not necessarily promote these market-oriented objec-
114. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
11S. In discussing the third factor, the Ash court cited Borak for the proposition that the
remedy sought must aid the primary goal. 422 U.S. at 84.
116. Id.; see Comment, Implying Private Causes of Action from Federal Statutes: Amtrak
and Cort Apply the Brakes, 17 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 53, 69-70 (1975).
117. See 422 U.S. at 84.
118. Id. at 80-81.
119. The Court concluded that recovery of derivative damages by the corporation would not
deter violations but merely permit directors to utilize corporate funds for campaign contributions
and repay the corporation at a later date. Id. at 84.
120. Id.
121. 377 U.S. at 432.
122. Id. at 431.
123. Id.
124. McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 359, 364 (N.D. Ga.
1977).
125. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
126. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934), reprinted in 5 Legislative History,
supra note 12, Item 18, at 8.
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fives. 127 Unlike an isolated violation of section 14(a), which threatens the
statutory purpose to protect shareholders, an isolated violation of section 7
does not threaten to cause a significant alteration in the national credit policy.
Since only widespread disregard of section 7 would adversely affect the
allocation of credit in the securities market, it is unnecessary to detect every
infraction. 128 Because the existing enforcement scheme is sufficient to uncover
such widespread violations, creation of a private remedy is not a necessary
supplement to the enforcement of section 7.129
The necessity of a private action to deter violations of the regulatory statute
has also been found to satisfy the third criterion. 130 It is arguable that
establishment of a private remedy under section 7 will prevent the growth of
isolated infractions into more frequent and troublesome violations. Prior to
section 7(f), however, creation of private rights of action may have been more
likely to promote rather than deter violations. Assume that an investor
borrowed funds to purchase securities from a lender who subsequently
violated the margin requirements. If the value of the security increased, the
investor could sell, pay back the loan, and enjoy the profits. If the value of the
stock decreased, he could either keep the securities in the hope that their
value would increase, or sell at the lower price and sue the lender to recover
the difference between the value of the stock at the time of the margin
violation and the amount for which they were finally sold. 131 Rather than
deterring infractions, this potential "free ride" might encourage the un-
scrupulous investor to induce wrongful loans.
Supporters of the deterrent theory argue that section 7(f) eliminates the
above consequences by subjecting the borrower to criminal sanctions for
margin violations. 132 An implied cause of action would thus deter margin
violations by lenders without encouraging infractions by borrowers.133 The
127. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d at 1147 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1148 (Friendly, J., dissenting); see Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,528, at 94,089 (D. Md. Feb. 16, 1978). The
Stern court stated: '1]t may not be necessary to uncover all violations. The danger the Act seeks
to prevent is a widespread disregard of the margin requirement sufficient to affect the general
economy. The SEC can easily detect and control such widespread violations." Id.
129. Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 96,528, at 94,089 (D. Md. Feb. 16, 1978); Schy v. FDIC, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,242, at 92,630-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) ("There is nothing that leads us
to believe that the Congressionally designed administrative and penal sanctions are ineffective.");
see Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d at 1148 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
130. Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915, 921 (D. Conn.
1977).
131. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d at 1148 (Friendly, J., dissenting) ("Any
deterrent effect of threatened liability on the broker may well be more than offset by the
inducement to violations inherent in the prospect of a free ride for the customer who, under the
majority's view, is placed in the enviable position of 'heads-I-win tails-you-lose.'").
132. See notes 32-39 supra and accompanying text.
133. McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 359, 365 (N.D. Ga.
1977). But see Drasner v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 485, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(Regulation X's exemption for innocent mistakes coupled with the admitted difficulty in determin-
ing investor's knowledge would invite investors to induce or acquiesce in the violations).
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validity of the deterrence argument is suspect, however. Courts have gener-
ally refused to utilize deterrence as the sole basis to imply a private remedy. 134
The Court in Piper and Ash doubted that damages awards in fact deter
statutory violations. 135 More importantly, even assuming the deterrent effect
of private actions, that alone should not satisfy the third criterion of Ash, The
fact that an implied cause of action may help prevent future violations,
thereby providing a useful tool in the overall enforcement scheme, does not
render such an action a necessary method of effectuating the legislative
purpose of the statute. 136 It would thus appear that the possible deterrent
effect of a private remedy is insufficient to satisfy the third Ash criterion.
D. State Law
The final factor set forth in Ash is whether the area has been traditionally
relegated to state law. An implied federal cause of action may be inappropri-
ate when a state remedy exists. In Ash, the Court found it significant that
state law regulates the corporate director and shareholder relationship, pro-
viding shareholders with actions for ultra vires acts and breaches of fiduciary
duty. 137 Moreover, the Court determined that the statutory purpose of
safeguarding elections would not be undermined if control over the internal
affairs of the corporation were left to state law. 138 However, a determination
that the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law is not
dispositive of the implication of a federal right. For example, the Court in
Borak inferred a federal cause of action from section 14(a) even though state
law governing proper corporate conduct extended its control to proxy state-
ments. 1
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Most courts have found that regulations of margin trading has not
historically been governed by the states, 140 and therefore that implication of a
federal action would not necessarily intrude upon state law. One court has
declared that, in lieu of a federal action, the states are free to provide
remedies for investors injured by their lenders' wrongful margin activities. 14'
134. In rejecting the claim that the threat of damages against a successful contestant In a
tender offer would provide additional protection for shareholders, the Piper Court noted that
"even though the SEC operates in this context under the same practical restraints recognized by
the Court in Borak, institutional limitations alone do not lead to the conclusion that any party
interested in a tender offer should have a cause of action for damages against a competing
bidder." 430 U.S. at 41; see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 84. The District of Connecticut has
asserted that Ash tacitly rejected the argument that the third criterion is met merely because of
the deterrent value of a private action. Theoharous v. Bache & Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI) $ 96,281, at 96,802 (D. Conn. 1977).
135. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 40; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 84.
136. See, e.g., Gluck v. Frankel, 440 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
137. 422 U.S. at 84.
138. Id. at 85. Congress did not seek to regulate corporate conduct per se, but only to
abrogate its import on federal elections. Id.
139. 377 U.S. at 434-35.
140. See, e.g., Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CC) V 96,528, at 94,089 (D. Md. Feb. 16, 1978); Schy v. FDIC, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) t 96,242, at 92,630 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
141. Theoharous v. Bache & Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,281, at 92,802 (D. Conn. 1977).
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Presumably such an action could be premised on common-law theories of
fiduciary duty. 142 However, to the extent that recovery would be allowed
even when the plaintiff investor had violated section 7(f), the state theory of
liability presumably would abrogate the purposes of the federal statute. In
that instance, section 7 should preclude the adoption of the state action. 143
Thus, given the difficulty of fashioning a remedy that would not undermine
section 7, states are unlikely to establish a right of recovery. Because a federal
remedy would not infringe upon state regulation, the fourth factor does not
counsel against implication of a private cause of action.
CONCLUSION
On balance, analysis of the Cort v. Ash factors suggests that no private
cause of action on behalf of investors for violations by lenders of the federal
margin provisions should be implied. Two of the Ash criteria demonstrate the
impropriety of implying private remedies. First, it seems indisputable that
section 7 was not enacted for the "especial benefit" of investors; second, the
purposes of the statute would not be advanced by a private action. The
remaining two factors do not refute this conclusion. Evidence of congressional
intent to create such an action is absent from the legislative history. Admit-
tedly, since an action by a borrower against a margin lender is not one
traditionally relegated to state law, implication of a federal action would not
unnecessarily duplicate local remedies. However, to do so would in no way
promote section 7's primarily macroeconomic objectives, and would anoma-
lously aid those whom it also regulates. Denial of a private action would
therefore seem to be the appropriate solution.
William M. Hartnett
142. See Note, Broker Dealers, Market Makers and Fiduciary Duties, 9 Loy. Chi. L.J. 746
(1978).
143. See Surgil v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., "69 Misc. 2d 213, 329 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Sup. CL.
1971) (broker who sold plaintiff's stock in accordance with federal margin regulations need not
remit profits on liquidation of the account). For a discussion of this case, see Margin Violations,
supra note 35, at 110-13.
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